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PREFERENCE, RATIONAL CHOICE AND ARROW'S THEOREM·

I

T seems intuitively plausible to expect of a consistent rational
agent that if he preferred an alternative x to another alternative
y and y to a third alternative z then he would still prefer x to y
if z suddenly became unavailable or y to z if x suddenly became un
available or x to z if y became unavailable. Similarly, if he was
given a choice only between x and y and expressed a preference for
,x over y, we should expect that, if a third alternative z became
available, x would still be preferred to y. As a consequence, we
should expect that, if x is the most preferred alternative from a set S
of alternatives, then x would be the most preferred alternative from
any subset of S of which x is a member; that is, we should expect
the following sentence to be true:
("itx){x £ Sl C S2 - [x £ C(S2) - x £ C(SI)]}

where x ranges over alternatives, Sl and S2 are sets of alternatives,
and C(S) denotes the value of a function (called a "choice func
tion") from S to the alternative(s) in S that is (are) preferred at least
as much as any other alternative in S. To remain consistent with
the literature on social choice theory, I shall follow A. K. Sen 1 in
referring to this as "property a."
It is easy to see why property a is a fundamental assumption in
virtually all the literature on rational preference and social choice.
Consider the case in which an individual is asked to give a prefer
ence ordering over three political candidates A, B, and C. If he
prefers A to Band B to C and A dies, then if no third candidate en
ters the race he should vote for B. If he, in fact, votes for C, then, it
would seem, this must be because he has just changed his mind or
• I am grateful to Ellis Crasnow, David Gauthier, James Kahan, Sharon Labrot,
Stephen Schiffer, Robert Schultz, and Bas van Fraassen for their comments on ear·
lier versions of this paper.
I Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden·Day, 1970).
0022·362X/SI/7S12/077S$00.SO
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because the death of A has triggered some complex chain of events
(for example, it was discovered th.at B killed A) that call for a major
reappraisal or because his ordering over A, B, and C was misre
corded initially or because of. some other such factor outside the
domain of rational preference.
I shall, however, present a case in which property a is violated
for none of these reasons, but rather for purely rational reasons.
Such a counterexample should be of intrinsic interest, since prop
erty a seems such a minimal constraint to place upon rational
preference and choice. Beyond this, however, is a point of specific
interest; for the basic intuition that underlies property a is also the
basic intuition behind one of the conditions necessary to prove Ar
row's impossibility theorem. The connection between Arrow's
theorem and my counterexample to property a will be discussed in
section II of this paper.
I

Consider a game in which two players A and B, who are prohibited
from communicating with each other, match coins against a bank.
They may show heads, tails, or nothing. The payoffs, with A's
shown first, are:
B

B

B

shows
heads

shows
nothing

shows
tails

2,2

-1,-1

-1,-1

-1,-1

I, I

-1,-1

-1,-1

-1,-1

2,2

A

shows
heads
A

shows
nothing
A

shows
tails

Probability theory dictates that in this situation two ideally ra
tional agents seeking to maximize their expected utility should set
tle upon a pair of strategies that will result in an undominated
equilibrium outcome. In this game there are three equilibrium
outcomes: (1) A and B showing heads, (2) A and B showing noth
ing, and (3) A and B showing tails. Outcome 2, however, is domi
nated by 1 and by 3.
Beyond the straightforward calculation, however, there is a cer
tain epistemic complication pointed out by David Gauthier which
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he calls "accessibility.,,2 Although 2 is dominated by both I and 3,
these two outcomes are inaccessible. Without communication
neither A nor B can form any expectation about which of the two
equally appealing outcomes the other will shoot for, and, without
such an expectation, playing either heads or tails commits one to a
50 per cent chance of receiving 2 and a 50 per cent chance of receiv
ing -1. Thus, playing either heads or tails becomes a bad gamble,
and, since we are assuming A and B to be ideally rational, they
should both realize this and show nothing in order to guarantee
themselves a return of 1.
So A and B should both prefer showing nothing to showing
either heads or tails, and, in addition, both should be indifferent
between showing heads and showing tails. Let us represent these
preference orderings as follows:
A
nothing
heads-tails

B

nothing
heads-tails

Now let us consider the same coin-matching game, but this time
A is allowed to use only two of his original strategies: showing

heads and showing nothing. The payoff matrix for this version of
the game is:
B

B

B

shows
heads

shows
nothing

shows
tails

2,2

-1,-1

-1,-1

-1,-1

1,1

-1,-1

A

shows
heads
A

shows
nothing

Since showing nothing is the rational choice in the set of alterna
tives {showing heads, showing nothing, showing tails}, property a
requires that it be the rational choice in the set {showing heads,
showing nothing}; but obviously this is false! In this second ver
sion of the game, A and B showing heads dominates A and B show
ing nothing, and, since A can't show tails (and B knows this), both
A and B should expect the other to show heads. In other words, A
2 "The Impossibility of Rational Egoism," this JOURNAL, LXXI (Aug. 15, 1974):
439-456, p. 448. Gauthier introduces the notion of accessibility in the context of the
same coin-matching game that I have used.
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and B showing heads is an accessible dominating equilibrium out
come, So, in this second version of the game, the preference order
ings become representable as:
A

B

heads
nothing

heads
nothing
tails

Note that not only has A's ordering been changed, but B's has
also-and this is just because one of A's alternatives has been
removed.
It is very important to note that it is just the removal of the al
ternative that brings on the reordering; for this fact separates the
present case from that mentioned earlier in which a person who
originally prefers three political candidates in order A-B-C winds
up voting for C rather than B, who is still in the race for office in
spite of the fact that he has been charged with the murder of A. In
this case the reordering from A-B-C to C-B is not brought on just
because the alternative of voting for A is removed, but rather be
cause it is removed in a certain way, and obviously it is unreason
able to expect property Q to hold regardless of what chain of events
is triggered in the process of removing an alternative. In other
words, property Q should be expected to hold all things being
equal, not come what may.
One might want to object to my counterexample on the grounds
that the reordering brought about there is not just a result of re
moving a single alternative, that by removing an alternative <?ne
somehow changes the game. But this claim is simply not true. The
rules that define the game and specify payoffs could be set out
without any mention of which alternative strategies each player
must have or, for that matter, without even specifying that every
player have a coin (since a player can show nothing).
There is another possible objection which isn't very good but I'll
mention it anyway. One might claim that I have done something
illicit by considering preference relations over strategies rather than
outcomes. If outcomes were being considered then there would be
no problem at all, for receiving 2 would always be preferred to re
ceiving 1 and 1 to receiving -1. This strikes me, though, as a very
thin hair to try to split. On one reading it attempts a distinction
between doing something and getting something, and one need
hardly point out that more often than not what people are trying
to get by their actions is the opportunity to do something. On
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another reading it attempts a distinction between instrumentally
good alternatives and intrinsically good alternatives, but one
would certainly not want to claim that preference relations should
be thought to obtain only between intrinsically good alternatives;
for then one could not prefer (strictly speaking) getting $1000 to
getting I¢, since money is of only instrumental value. At any rate,
one can easily devise a game in which the outcomes are directions
to use certain strategies in a second game, in which case an out
come just is a strategy.
A related line of attack would insist upon a requirement that,
whatever kind of alternatives can bear binary preference relations
to each other, the only kind that decision theory should concern it
self with are those with some kind of determinate value. Since the
alternatives in my counterexample are strategies in a gamble, they
do not have determinate values. In the first place, since the game in
my counterexample is between two ideally rational players (and
each knows that he is playing with an ideally rational player), their
chosen strategies do have determinate outcomes (How else could I
have known them?). Secondly, this requirement is too harsh any
way, since, as anyone who has tried to buy anything lately knows,
not even money is of determinate value.
II

Basically, the strategy behind the Arrow impossibility theorem is
to list some intuitively plausible constraints (or "conditions") that
any method of arriving at social choices on the basis of individual
preferences (which Arrow calls a "social welfare function"-or
SWF) should satisfy and then show that these conditions are incon
sistent and, thus, that no SWF can possibly meet them. Informally,
three of the four conditions necessary in order to prove the Arrow
theorem are:
(I) The SWF must supply a social ordering for every logically
possible combination of individual preference orderings
over any given set of alternatives (unrestricted domain).
(2) If everyone in the society prefers x to y, then the SWF must
result in a social ordering of x over y (Pareto principle).
(3) The SWF cannot specify that the preferences of a single
individual determines a social ordering on every issue
regardless of the preferences of everyone else (non
dictatorship) .
The fourth condition is of special importance here; so it will be
stated formally:
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(4) Let RI, ... , Rn and RI', ... ,Rn' be two sets of individual
orderings, and let C(S) and C'(S) be the corresponding
social choice functions. If, for all individuals i and all
alternatives x and y in a given environment S, XRiY if and
only if xR;'y, then C(S) and C'(S) are the same (independ
ence of irrelevant alternatives). 3
The notation 'xR.y' here should be read "individual i prefers x at
least as much as y." Informally, what is being required by this
condition is that the social ordering derived from a given set (or
"environment") S of individual orderings be unaffected by the ex
istence of orderings over alternatives not in S.
The effect of this requirement is twofold. First, it rules out the
interjection of nonfeasible alternatives into lists of feasible ones in
order to determine interpersonal comparisons of strengths of pref
erence. For example, given that a choice is to be made between two
alternatives x and y in a society of two individuals A and Band
that A prefers x to y and B prefers y to x, we would think it reason
able to say that the society as a whole is indifferent between x and
y. If, however, we were to interject the set of nonfeasible alterna
tives {+$1000, +$1, -$1, -$1000} into the set of feasible ones {x, y}
and A's and B's orderings were then representable as follows:

A

B

+$1000
+$1
x
y
-$1
-$1000

Y
+$1000
+$1
-$1
-$1000
x

then it would seem reasonable to say that y should be the social
choice, since B strongly prefers y to x and A just barely prefers x to
y. But the independence condition rules out this change of mind
from our original finding that society should be indifferent be
tween x and y.4 Since the choice-in fact-involves only x and y, it
3 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale, 1963), p. 27. Parenthetical page references hereafter will be to this
book. Arrow's original proof used five conditions. I am following Sen in using only
four. The numbers I have assigned to the four conditions do not correspond to those
used by Arrow.
'This problem with the independence condition is noted by R. Duncan Luce and
Howard Rai££a in Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 341.

784

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

should, according to the independence condition, be independent
of alternatives that cannot-in fact-be chosen. The essential point
of this requirement is, as Arrow puts it, to reinforce the principle
that "Only observable differences can be used as a basis for expla
nation" (109). He continues,
Given the set of alternatives available for society to choose among, it
could be expected that, ideally, one could observe all preferences
among the available alternatives, but there would be no way to ob
serve preferences among alternatives not feasible for society (110).

The second effect of this condition is to enforce a certain concep
tion of rationality which holds "that the choice to be made from
any set alternatives can be determined by the choices made between
pairs of alternatives" (20). Stated alternatively,
Knowing the social choices made in pairwise comparisons ... deter
mines the entire social ordering and therewith the social choice func
tion C (S) for all possible environments (28).

The usual course pursued by those who would take Arrow to
task on the independence condition is to attack the condition be
cause of its first effect, arguing either that Arrow's presupposed
constraints on observability are too harsh and that empirically
respectable methods of determining preference strength do existS
or-as John Harsanyi does-that the whole business of firmly
shackling explanation to observables is "a result of uncritical ac
ceptance of a seriously mistaken-and by now completely super
seded-philosophical doctrine, that of logical positivism.,,6 The
case made by either of these arguments is quite strong. As for the
first, although it may be difficult-in practice-to ascertain
strengths of preferences by interjecting nonfeasible alternatives, it
is not difficult to suppose that-in principle-such information
can be reliably obtained, and, at least in those cases when it can be
obtained, it should be used-or, at least, not disregarded as a matter
of principle. The power of Harsanyi's line of argument is, I think,
fairly obvious, given the general turn away from positivism in the
last few decades, and he has convinced many people working in the
field of social decision theory to see things his way.
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of these attacks, however,
mine is an attack on the other front. What is called into question
S Several suggestions about how strengths of preferences can be calculated and
amalgamated within various sets of constraints on observability are discussed by
Luce and Raiffa, pp. 345-353.
6 "Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem," Theory and /Jecision, XI, 3 (September 1979): 289-317, p. 302.
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by my counterexample to property a is the whole conception of ra
tional preference formation which it and the independence condi
tion are intended to capture. In particular, I am arguing that, in
general, when a fully rational agent arrives at a choice from a set S
of alternatives, he is not necessarily asserting anything at all about
what his second, third, or fourth choices would be if his first choice
became nonfeasible, and, likewise, that when he gives his pairwise
comparisons over all the two-member subsets of S, he is not neces
sarily asserting anything at all about his choice from S. Given,
then, that this conception of rationality seems to be missing some
thing at the level of individual choice, it is not at all clear why we
should try to impose it at the level of social choice by requiring the
condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
It should be pointed out that arguments against the independ
ence condition like mine were, to some extent, anticipated by
Arrow; for he realized that
... the model of rational choices as built up from pair-wise compari
sons does not seem to suit well the case of rational behavior in the ...
game situation .... The precise shape of a formulation of rationality
which takes ... [game-theoretic considerations] into account or the
consequences of such. a reformulation on the theory of choice in gen
eral or the theory of social choice in particular cannot be foreseen; but
it is at least a possibility, to which attention should be drawn, that the
paradox discussed below [Arrow's theorem] might be resolved by such
a broader concept of rationality (20/21).

Although the point of divergence between the game-theoretic con
ception of rational choice and Arrow's conception which I have
pointed out is not the same as the one Arrow noticed,7 I think it
fair to say that what I have done here is to press the basic issue with
which Arrow was concerned.
TAL SCRIVEN

University of Southern California
California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo

7 The point of dissimilarity in question which Arrow noticed was that in a game
situation the environment from which an agent must choose contains an infinite
number of alternatives, since any environment that contains more than one strategy
also contains all the possible randomizations over those strategies. Thus, a choice
could not be produced by pairwise comparisons, for there are infinitely many of
them to make. See Arrow, p. 20.

